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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERA L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
HAROLD L. JOHNSON, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon domestic law and equity. This 
appeal is taken from portions of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment and Order in which the Plaintiff-Appellant made 
a request for a portion of the Defendant - Respondent's military 
retirement benefits based upon the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act (10 U.S.C.S. Sec. 1408). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court in the Judgment and Order signed December 
12, 1985 and entered December 13, 1985 denied Plaintiff-Appellantfs 
request for an allocation of Defendant - Respondent's military 
retiranent benefits based upon the theory of estoppel. The Notice 
of Appeal was filed in the District Court on or about January 8, 
1986. The Court ruled that since Plaintiff had failed to request an 
allocation of a portion of the military retiranent benefits in the 
earlier Order to Show Cause heard in June of 1984, that she be 
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estopped from bringing the matter before the Court in the November, 
1985 hearing. Plaintiff - Appellant believes the Court failed to 
apply the federal law correctly considering that the divorce was 
granted in January of 1982, and the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act was enacted in 1982 and made 
retroactive to June 26, 1981, the Defendant - Respondent retired in 
June of 1985, and the Plaintiff - Appellant sought relief in 
November of 1985, only three months later. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the Court award to the Plaintiff - Appellant a portion 
of Defendant - Respondent's military retirement income based upon 
the years that she ws married to him while he was in active military 
service pursuant to the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection 
Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The Plaintiff - Appellant had been married to the Defendant 
- Respondent for eighteen years and 10 months of his thirty-one 
total years in military service. The parties were granted a Decree 
of Divorce on January 22, 1982. The Court awarded the Plaintiff -
Appellant $500.00 per month as and for alimony. At the time of the 
divorce, the Defendant - Respondent was gainfully employed in the 
military. At the time the divorce was heard, Utah courts did not 
recognize unvested military retirement benefits as marital property 
subject to division; therefore, the issue of retirement benefits was 
not raised at the time of the parties1 stipulation. 
In 1984, Plaintiff - Appellant brought an action to enforce 
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the alimony provisions as the Defendant - Respondent was in arrears 
and the Court awarded a judgment to the Plaintiff - Appellant in 
June of 1984. 
One year later, Defendant - Respondent retired from the 
military in June of 1985, with a total of thirty-one years of 
service. Plaintiff - Appellant was notified in July of 1985 that 
the Defendant - Respondent had retired from the military and that 
she might be eligible for a portion of his military retirement and 
benefits under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act. 
Plaintiff - Appellant filed an Order to Show Cause in 
November of 1985 for such relief and since the Defendant -
Respondent was again delinquent in his alimony payments for a second 
judgment for alimony. Plaintiff - Appellant's motion requested that 
the Plaintiff - Appellant be awarded delinquent alimony and a 
portion of Defendant - Respondent's military retirement benefits 
based upon the years she was married to him while he was employed in 
military service. Plaintiff - Appellant asked the Court to 
terminate alimony if her request for military retirement benefits 
was granted. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether a former spouse is entitled to a portion of her 
husband's military retirement pursuant to the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act 10 USCS Sec. 1408 when the issue was 
not considered in the divorce action, since the divorce was granted 
before the Act was enacted but during the period made retroactive by 
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the Act. 
2. Whether a divorce court can deny consideration of such 
an issue upon the theory of equitable estoppel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act 
requires state courts to consider a division of military retirement 
based upon the number of years married once said spouse has met the 
requirement for eligibility under the Act. Congress fully intended 
the former spouses to return to court and have the court apply the 
Act to those divorce cases which were decided before the law was 
enacted but after McCarty was decided. The Act placed no time 
requirements upon when a former spouse must return to court to 
request such a division. 
In the instant case, the former spouse was notified that her 
husband was retiring and that she was eligible pursuant to the Act 
and needed to modify the Decree of Divorce accordingly. 
The lower court erred in that it misapplied the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel and held that Plaintiff - Appellant failed to 
raise that issue when she sought a judgment for alimony arrearage a 
year prior to Defendant - Respondent retiring, and therefore, 
Plaintiff - Appellant's request to modify the decree, apporting 
Defendant - Respondent's retirement in lieu of further alimony was 
barred. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE 
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DEFENDANT - RESPONDENT'S RETIREMENT AS PER PUBLIC LAW 97-252, 
UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES PROTECTION ACT (10 U.S.C.S. SEC. 
1408). 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 
enacted by Congress in 1982, overruled, for the most part, the 
effect of McCarty v. McCarty, 453 US 210, 69 L Ed. 2d 589, 101 Set 
2728. In the 1981 McCarty case, the United States Supreme Court 
held that upon dissolution of a military officer's marriage, a state 
court was precluded by federal law from dividing military 
nondisability retired pay pursuant to state property laws. Federal 
statute 10 USCS Sec. 2771, indicates that Congress intended retired 
pay to be a personal entitlement. 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act in 
overruling McCarty provides that a state court can divide military 
retirement benefits as a part of a distribution of marital property 
incident to a divorce proceeding. The marriage must have been in 
existence for a minimum of ten years and the spouse's portion cannot 
exceed fifty percent. The purpose of the Act is to return 
jurisdiction of the issue to the states. Since the Decree of 
Divorce in the case at bar was granted after June 26, 1981, the Act 
allows the Plaintiff - Appellant to return to Court and have her 
case considered as one of first impression. 
There is considerable authority in other states for the 
contention that retirement benefits, whether military or otherwise, 
vested or non-vested are considered a marital asset, subject to 
division. This holds true whether the request to have the 
retirement benefits divided comes at the time of dissolution or at a 
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later date. 
In Smith v. Smith, 699 P2.d 448 (Wash 1983), the former 
wife filed a petition for modification of a dissolution decree 
asking to be awarded a percentage of the former husband's military 
retired pension payments. Former husband responded asking that the 
court set aside his deed of the family home to the wife. The 
military pension had not been awardecl to either spouse in the 
original decree or in the final documents granting the dissolution. 
Mr. Smith testified that although there was no agreement between him 
and his wife at the time he deeded the house to her, he took this 
action to "cause her to stop any action toward trying to secure 
one-half of my retirement pay." The trial court concluded, and the 
Supreme Court upheld that there was no agreement or waiver by the 
wife of her rights in the military pension in exchange for the deed. 
In Gordon v. Gordon, 659 SW2d 475, (Tex. App. 13 Dist 
1983) , the Court held the failure of the trial court to consider the 
husband's military retired benefits in apportioning community estate 
was error in light of subsequent enactment of the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, even though the 
trial court was not at fault since the law at the time of the 
divorce decree effectively precluded the trial court from 
considering such benefits. 
On motion of the wife to reopen an eighteen month old 
judgment to permit additional evidence and argument, the Family 
Court in Smith v. Smith, 458 A.2d 711, (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) held 
that the wife's motion in view of the Uniformed 
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Services Fornter Spouses Protection Act, to reopen would be granted, 
since the decision to reopen was a decision to permit the wife to 
present her case under Delaware law as it existed before McCarty 
and to do otherwise would be to carve out a category of people whose 
cases were decided between June 25, 1981 and September 9, 1982 and 
deprive them of substantial property interest which other similarly 
situated litigants have been awarded. 
Where trial court still had control of its divorce 
judgment, awarding husband all military retirment 
benefits, when United States Supreme Court's 
McCarty decision was overturned by 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 
community estate had divisible interest in husbandfs 
military nondisability retirement benefits. 
Veronin v. Veronin, 662 SW.2d 102 (Tex. App. 3 
Dist. 1983) 
In Walentowski v. Walentowski, 672 P.2d 657 (NM 1983), the 
wife appealed from a dissolution decree challenging the division of 
marital property. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, which allows each 
state to determine if military retirement benefits are to be 
considered marital property, applied retroactively to the date of 
McCarty and hence, although the Act was effect after the date of 
the final divorce, the wife was entitled to the Act's benefits. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Ut 1982) held that the concept 
of "vesting" of retirement or pension is an inappropriate basis for 
determining what property should be subject to equitable division in 
divorce proceedings. 
The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the trial Court's award of 
a portion of the husband's retirement benefits that accrued during 
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marriagef notwithstanding the husband was not entitled to such 
benefits until he worked fifteen additional years. 
Woodward overruled Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 839 (Ut 
1980) in which the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's division 
of the husbandfs retirement benefits because the governments future 
contribution to retirement funds was found to have no present value. 
To the extent that Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may 
limit the ability of the Court to consider all of 
the parties1 assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is expressly 
overruled. Woodward, Op.cit. 
It was the intention of Congress that spouses aggrieved as a 
result of McCarty should have a chance to rectify the situation 
when the report stated at page 5: 
Former spouses divorced in the interum period 
between the McCarty decision and the effective 
date of this law will have the opportunity to return 
to Court to have their decrees modified in light of 
this legislation. 
Based upon the interest of Congress and the holdings of 
other states in similar factual situations, the Court erred in 
denying Plaintiff-Appellant a hearing to allocate her entitlement to 
Defendant-Respondent military benefits under the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, which law was mandated by 
Congress and made applicable to the state courts. 
POINT TWO 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO 
PREVENT BRINGING FORTH THE ISSUE OF THE DEFENDANT - RESPONDENT'S 
MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS BEFORE THE COURT AS THE ELEMENTS OF 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED. 
Broadly speaking the essential elements of estoppel 
are: (1) Conduct which amounts to a false 
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representations or concealment of material facts or 
at least which is calculated to convey the 
impression that the facts are otherwise then and 
inconsistent with, those which the party 
subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, 
or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall 
be acted upon or influence, the other party or other 
persons; and (3) knowledge actual or constructive, 
of the real facts. 28 AM JUR 2d Sec. 35, Estoppel 
and Waiver pp. 640-641. 
Further elements as relating to the party claiming the 
estoppel are: (1) lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge of 
the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance in good faith 
upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) 
action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change 
the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel to his 
injury, detriment or prejudice. 28 AM JUR 2d Sec 35, 
Estoppel and Waiver pp. 640-641. 
The above elements have not been satisfied as the omission 
of the military retirement pension was not due to fraud, false 
representation or concealment. The law under McCarty, the 
controlling case at the time of dissolution, precluded consideration 
of the benefits as marital property. Further, the Defendant -
Respondent has not shown a change in status to his detriment. 
In Henn v. Henn, 605 P.2d 10 (Cal 1980), the wife's 
failure to assert her community property rights to the husband's 
military retirement pension during divorce proceedings did not 
collaterally estop her from asserting her right to the pension in a 
later action. A finding by the trial court in 
de Carteret v. de Carteret, 615 P.2d 513 (Wash App 1980) that the 
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om iss ion of retirement funds of the husband and wife from the 
dissolution decree was inadvertent could not support the conclusion 
that the husband received the funds by implication, in that the 
decree of dissolution did not purport to dispose of the parties1 
retirement benefits, either expressly or by reference. 
The Court held that the wife should not be denied contenancy 
rights in the military retirement benefits which had inadvertently 
been omitted from the dissolution decree under the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel where there was no act or statement indicating 
any inconsistency or impropriety in the wife's representations, and 
the record reflected that failure to consider the retirement was 
merely an innocent oversight shared by the husband. 
POINT THREE 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS TIMELY IN HER RETURN TO COURT TO 
REQUEST AN AWARD OF A PORTION OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
Under McCarty, the controlling case at the time the 
divorce was heard in January of 1982, military retirement benefits 
were not divisible marital property and therefore not included in 
the property disposition. 
The military retirement benefits were also not at issue at 
the hearing on the Plaintiff - Appellant's Order to Show Cause for 
delinquent alimony in June of 1984 as the Defendant - Respondent did 
not retire until one year later in June of 1985. The sole purpose 
of the June, 1984 Show Cause hearing was to enforce the alimony 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered in January of 1982. The 
Plaintiff - Appellant was notified in July of 1985 that she might be 
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elicjible for a portion of Defendant - Respondent's military 
retirement benefits and filed an Order to Show Cause requesting an 
award of a portion of said benefits within four months of the 
notification. 
There is considerable case law dealing with property not 
disposed of in the judgment or decree of divorce in which the 
parties are properly afforded the opportunity to return to court for 
disposition. 
Where issue of husband's military pension was not 
before the Court which issued final decree of 
marriage dissolution, wife's putative interest in 
such asset was not extinguished by decree and wife 
could later bring action claiming that she had 
community property interest in pension to extent it 
was earned during marriage. Henn, Op.cit. 
Because a spouse's entitlement to a share of 
community property arises at the time that the 
property is acquired, and that interest is not 
altered except by judicial decree or an agreement 
between the parties, property which is not mentioned 
in the pleadings in a dissolution proceeding as 
community property is left unadjudicated by the 
decree, and is subject to future litigation, the 
parties being tenants in common meanwhile. 24 AM 
JUR 2d Sec. 958, Divorce and Separation, p. 945; 
See also Barros, Op.cit.; de Carteret, Op.cit.; 
Gordon, Op.cit. 
POINT FOUR 
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT SHOULD RECEIVE COURT ORDERED PAYMENTS 
DIRECTLY FROM THE MILITARY FINANCE CENTER. 
The Defendant - Respondent has fallen into arrears in 
alimony payments on two previous occassions. It has been necessary 
for the Plaintiff - Appellant to file actions to bring the Defendant 
- Respondent before the Court to protect her source of support. If 
the Court upholds her right to receive direct payments from the 
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military finance center, Plaintiff - Appellant's right to support 
will be protected without the necessity of future court action. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant is clearly entitled to one half of 
eighteen years ten months of thirty-one years of 
Defendant-Respondent's military retirement together with such other 
entitlements Plaintiff-Appellant may be entitled to. The Court 
erred in denying consideration of such an award under a theory of 
estoppel. Other states have considered this issue and have held 
that Plaintiff-Appellant is entitled to such second award as has 
been requested by Plaintiff-Appellant since that was the the intent 
of Congress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of June, 1986. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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